Clean Development Mechanism Explained: What the Article 6.4 Successor Changes
The CDM created the first large UN-linked carbon market and exposed its weak points. The Article 6.4 mechanism is built to fix them. Here is what changed and what buyers should still check.
For more than a decade the Clean Development Mechanism was the main route by which emissions reductions in developing countries became tradable carbon credits. Its successor is the Article 6.4 mechanism, created by the Paris Agreement in 2015 and often called the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism, or PACM. This article explains how the old system worked, what went wrong with it, and what a buyer should check when a credit claims to come from the new framework.
The Clean Development Mechanism was set up under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. A project in a developing country that reduced emissions could be registered with a UN body, the CDM Executive Board, and issue certified emission reductions. Companies and governments in developed countries bought them to meet their own targets. The model created a large market and gave many projects in Asia, Latin America and Africa their first carbon revenue. It also exposed weaknesses that later shaped every rule that followed.
Most of those weaknesses concerned proof. Additionality tests asked whether a project would have gone ahead without carbon revenue, and baselines set the reference point against which reductions were counted. When those tests were generous, projects could be credited for reductions that were not truly additional. A small group of industrial gas projects generated volumes of credits far larger than their climate benefit justified, and the Executive Board later tightened the rules for them. Oversight was centralised and slow, and buyers' trust in CDM credits fell over the 2010s.
The Article 6.4 mechanism keeps a UN body at the centre, but its structure is different. A Supervisory Body under the Paris Agreement sets the standards, approves methodologies and registers activities. Projects must show net mitigation, meaning that emissions fall overall and not only inside a project boundary. Part of the value of each unit is also set aside, through a share of proceeds that supports adaptation and a cancellation that addresses overall mitigation of global emissions. The aim is that the system does not simply reshuffle reductions that were already happening.
Transition is the other point to understand. Some registered CDM projects were allowed to move into the new mechanism if they met its rules. A credit issued under the old system is therefore not automatically the same as one issued under the new one, and the vintage, the transition status and the methodology all matter. A buyer should check which framework issued a unit, rather than relying on the presence of the word UN or on the name of the mechanism.
Corresponding adjustments apply here too. When a host country transfers a unit internationally, it must record a corresponding adjustment so that the same reduction is not counted once by the host and again by the buyer. The mechanism sets out this accounting, but how each country tracks and reports its adjustments still varies. A buyer should ask whether the unit carries an authorised adjustment and whether the host country has approved the activity that produced it.
For buyers, the practical checks are straightforward. Ask which methodology applies and whether it was approved by the Supervisory Body or carried over from a CDM methodology. Ask how the net mitigation test was applied and what share of proceeds was set aside. Ask whether the vintage falls inside the crediting period and whether the registry record can be inspected by anyone. Most of these answers sit in public documents, so a seller who cannot point to them has given you a reason to look harder.
The lesson from the CDM is that a UN label does not guarantee quality. The rules and the evidence behind each unit matter more than the name of the mechanism. Article 6.4 is more demanding on paper, with stronger central oversight and a clearer test of net mitigation. Whether it delivers in practice will depend on how methods are approved, how projects are checked and how carefully buyers read what each unit actually represents.
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